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Engquist and the Erosion of the Equal
Protection Clause:
An Attempt to Stop the Creep of Irrational Dicta
DARIEN

SHANSKE*

This Article is about the erosion of the protections offered by the Equal Protection
Clause resulting from the Supreme Court's decision in Engquist v. Oregon
Department of Agriculture. Lower courts, purportedly following Engquist, have
limited the reach of the Equal Protection Clause in several dozen cases in the last year.
Until Engquist, it was uncontroversialthat any person alleging irrationaltreatment by a
government official could at least challenge the government official to give a reason
that would satisfy rational basis review. Since the Supreme Court decided Engquist,
lower courts have leapt to find that government officials cannot be found liable under
the Equal Protection Clause for any action considered "discretionary." It would be
problematic if this striking curtailment of individual rights was actually required by the
Supreme Court's decision in Engquist, but the Court held no such thing, though the
Court offered some expansive dicta that could be so interpreted. This Article aims to
counter the creep of these dicta among the lower courts, and explains in particularwhy
these dicta are not consistent with constitutionalvalues.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I wish to
thank Kinch Hoekstra, Evan Lee, Ethan Leib, Heidi Maibom, Sanjay Narayan, and Reuel Schiller.
Thanks also to Paul Fraidenburgh for research assistance. Disclosure: I have consulted on the
plaintiffs side of a case involving the extension of Engquist. All opinions and errors are my own.

[969]

970

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:969

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION..............................................

....... 970

. THE CASES ANDTHE CREEP.......................................973

A. ENGQUIST.....................................
...... 973
..... 976
B. OLECH.......................................
C. THE CREEP OF ENGQUIST
.......................
.......- 978
982
.....................
II. WHY ENGQUIST SHOULD NOT BE BROADENED
...............- 982
A. POOR AND IMPROPER JURISPRUDENTIAL METHOD.
B. OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE EXPANSION OF THE ENGQUIST RULE .. 982
i. Arbitrary Expansion of Official Immunity.................983
2. Is "Discretion"Itself a Clear (or Desirable) Standard?........ 984
987
.........
3. The Old Rule Is Functional and Important........
992
....................
4. In Defense of Rational Basis....
5. Why This Dicta Is Bad for Local Governments.............994
....... 996
CONCLUSION...............................................

INTRODUCTION

I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal
Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate
between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation
fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is not merely
abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should
not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary
action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a
few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political
retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were
affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be
just than to require that laws be equal in operation.'
Justice Jackson's point should be a truism as a matter of
constitutional doctrine, but recent developments seriously undermine the
vitality of the Equal Protection Clause. To understand what is at stake, I
will begin with a nonhypothetical anecdote.
Suppose that I own a small restaurant. My profit margin is tight,
entirely provided by the sale of wine. Every two years I must renew my
liquor license with the city. I have now done so for twenty years-the
process is quick and efficient. This year, the bureaucrat in charge of

i. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.

io6,

II2-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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renewing licenses is my old high school nemesis, who maliciously delays
and then rejects my liquor license renewal. Every day I operate without a
liquor license, I lose money.
Do I have a claim under the Federal Constitution against this
government bureaucrat? The answer used to simply be "yes." I could sue
the bureaucrat in her personal capacity' under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violating my constitutional right to equal protection.3 Specifically, I could
claim that her treatment of me was irrational, motivated solely by malice.
Since in this example I have no argument that I was persecuted because
of membership in a protected class (for instance, race or gender), I would
proceed as a so-called "class of one," and my claim would be tested
under the lowest level of scrutiny-rational basis review. To be sure,
such deferential review makes it unlikely that I will succeed in my claim.4
Still, as every lawyer knows, unlikely is not impossible.
There would also be additional doctrinal hurdles. The defendant
bureaucrat could claim qualified immunity, and thus even if he did
violate my rights, I could not collect if he could show that what he did
was objectively reasonable. 6 This issue of qualified immunity must be
addressed as early in the litigation as possible. What's more, plaintiffs
asserting that they were treated arbitrarily must generally establish a
very high level of similarity with others treated differently.8 If my

2. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991) (even state officials can be sued in their personal
capacity under § 1983).

3. This is the holding of Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000), though as
that case points out, this is essentially a reaffirmation of a much older principle, namely that all
individuals, regardless of membership in a particular class, are entitled to equal protection of the law
(as eloquently described by Justice Jackson above). See id. at 564; see also William D. Araiza,
ConstitutionalRules and Institutional Roles: The Fate of the Equal Protection Class of One and What It
Means for Congressional Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REV. 27, 38-39 (2009)
(doctrinal history); V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal
Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955, 962-65 (2009) (same). Note that Nourse and Maguire ultimately argue
for a return to a more robust equal protection analysis without discussion of the threat posed by the
Engquist line of cases discussed herein.
4. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (classic example of
weakness of rationality review).
5. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); see also Robert C. Farrell, Successful
Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L.
REV. 357 ('999). The famous remark of Justice Jackson on equal protection cited above is itself cited
in another celebrated constitutional case seemingly decided on rational basis review. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For more on the not-entirely-toothless
nature of rational basis review, see discussion infra Part II.B.3-4.
6. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo, 818 (1982) (description of qualified
immunity).
7. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 8o8, 8i5 (2009) (timing of analysis).
8. See, e.g., Purze v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2002) ("In order to
succeed, the [plaintiffs] must demonstrate that they were treated differently than someone who is
prima facie identical in all relevant respects.").
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restaurant is in a small town, then perhaps there are no other comparable
restaurants.
And so there has long been clear equal protection doctrine that
represented our constitutional values, namely that all are equal under the
law. There has also been a long development of various legal doctrines
that protected the courts from a feared flood of litigation if every
government decision could be challenged as infringing on some person's
right to equal protection. Using Mitchell Berman's helpful nomenclature,
we can say that a relatively stable understanding of the Constitution as to
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, an "operative proposition,"
has been shaped by a large series of "decision rules" that, in fact, make it
difficult pragmatically to assert an equal protection claim in a class-ofone case.9
The difficulty of bringing a class-of-one case under these "decision
rules" has a filtering-out effect on these cases, which is positive to the
extent that we would not want every government action to open the door
to liability. Yet it is also positive as a matter of political theory for these
cases to be possible. It is a check on petty bureaucratic tyrants
everywhere that they may be called to give public reasons for what they
have done. Thus, despite the manifest difficulty of proceeding and the
unlikelihood of winning, established equal protection doctrine used to
stand unambiguously for the principle that I was entitled to a certain
minimal level of rationality when interacting with government officialsand that I could enforce this entitlement in federal court.
So what has happened to throw this all in doubt? Lower federal
courts have begun to hold that the so-called class-of-one equal protection
theory is no longer viable whenever the challenged government action is
"discretionary." 0 The upshot of this new doctrine is that my cause of
action for the events described above would be completely taken away
because the malicious bureaucrat in my hypothetical was entrusted with
discretion over liquor licenses. The courts that have embraced this
implausible equal protection analysis have argued that they are following
the Supreme Court's instructions in Engquist v. Oregon Department of
Agriculture."
In this brief Article I argue first that these courts are incorrect as a
matter of law as to the holding and rationale of Engquist. Second, I will
9. Mitchell N. Berman, ConstitutionalDecision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2004).
xo. The list of such courts is growing. See, e.g., Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-

8oo (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891.

9oo-o (7th Cir. 2oo8); Douglas Asphalt Co.
v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (1ith Cir. 2008): JDC Mgmt., LLC v. Reich, 644 F. Supp. 2d 905,910
(W.D. Mich. 2009); Sloup v. Loeffler, No. o5-CV-1766 (JFB) (AKT), 2008 WL 3978208, at *i5-i6
(ED.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008). But see Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 494-95 (7th Cir. 2009) (critiquing
creep of Engquist); Franks v. Rubitschun, No. 07-1I181, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4164, at *&-7 n.3 (6th
Cir. Feb. 23, 2009) (sarne).
II. 128. S. Ct. 2146 (2008).
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argue that this attempt to expand dicta from Engquist is misguided as a
matter of theory and policy.

I.
A.

THE CASES AND THE CREEP

ENGQUIST

In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, the plaintiff, an
employee of the Oregon Department of Agriculture, sued her employer
on a number of grounds, including that she was discriminated against on
the basis of membership in a protected class, but also simply as a class of
one.' 2 After a jury trial, the plaintiff in Engquist won only on her class-ofone theory.' 3
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, plaintiffs will typically sue
under more than one theory.' 4 Going a little further than Justice Stevens,
one can surmise that the jury reached its conclusion in Engquist through
the unfolding of the following dynamic: The plaintiff had to show
intentional discrimination to prevail as a member of a protected class.
This is hard to prove, though perhaps only because this kind of invidious
discrimination has gotten more subtle,' 5 and apparently the plaintiff did
not prove this point to the jury's satisfaction.' 6 It may have perhaps been
easier to prove that, rather than having an invidious reason, the
defendants had no reason at all for their actions. Although her protectedclass claim failed, the plaintiff did successfully convince the jury on her
class-of-one argument." Whether or not this accurately describes how the
jury reached its verdict in Engquist, it is important to note the
relationship between the class-of-one theory and other theories in equal
protection cases; as elaborated upon later, the viability of a class-of-one
claim provides plaintiffs with a viable cause of action when other theories
of liability are foreclosed, whether by problems of proof or legal bars.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment for
Engquist, refusing to recognize as a matter of law a class-of-one theory in
the public employment context.' 8 Recognizing a split among the circuit
courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Only the viability of the
class-of-one theory was before the Supreme Court,20 and the Court

12.

Id. at 2149-50.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 2161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15. See Araiza, supra note 3, at 3116. See Engquist, 128S. Ct. at 2149.
£7.Id. at 2149-2150.

18. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478 F-3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007).
19. Engquist, 1285S. Ct. at 2150.

20. In fact, the grant of certiorari was only as to the application of the class-of-one theory to
public employment. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Engquist, £28 S. Ct. 2146 (No. 07-474), 2oo7
WL 2962922 (Question x reads: "Whether traditional equal protection 'rational basis' analysis under
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affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that "a 'class-of-one' theory of equal
protection has no place in the public employment context."' The
Supreme Court repeated several times that its holding was limited to the
public employment context.
The reasoning of the Court explains why its holding was limited.
The Court began its analysis by emphasizing that "we have long held the
view that there is a crucial difference, with respect to constitutional
analysis, between the government exercising 'the power to regulate or
license, as lawmaker,' and the government acting 'as proprietor, to
manage [its] internal operation.""' The Court then cited a long series of
cases in which this distinction was relevant, particularly as to public
employees in leading cases involving the First and Fourth Amendments. 4
The rationale for this doctrinal distinction is "the 'common-sense
realization that government offices could not function if every
employment decision became a constitutional matter."' As the Court
observed, "[t]o treat employees differently is not to classify them in a
way that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to exercise
the broad discretion that typically characterizes the employer-employee
2

relationship."26

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech applies to public employers who intentionally treat similarly situated
employees differently with no rational bases for arbitrary, vindictive or malicious reasons?" (citation
omitted)).
21. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2148-49.

22. See id. at 2156 ("[We] conclud[e] that the class-of-one theory of equal protection has no
application in the public employment context-and that is all we decide...."); id. at 2157
("[R]atifying a class-of-one theory of equal protection in the context of public employment would
impermissibly "constitutionalize the employee grievance." (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
154 (1983))).
23. Id. at 2151 (alteration in original) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)).
24. Id. (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-22 (1987)); id. at 2152 (citing Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983)). The Supreme Court might also have added its dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence, which treats governments differently whether they are acting as a
market participant or a regulator, or its First Amendment property jurisprudence, where again the
government is treated differently when acting as a landowner versus a regulator. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (example of forum analysis in First
Amendment context); White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983)
(market participant exception to dormant commerce clause). Again and again, the rationale is the
same: that the government must be allowed the leeway to organize its own internal affairs as it sees fit.

25. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2151 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 143).

26. Id. at 2155. It is passages like this that I believe indicate that the Court is arguing that in
public employment cases there simply is no violation and hence is offering an interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause. William Araiza disagrees and points to passages that indicate that the Court
acknowledges the possibility of a violation, but emphasizes the practical impossibility of such
violations being adjudicated by a court. See Araiza, supra note 3, at 69-70. 1 do not think there is much
to be gained by arguing about nomenclature on this point given that, at the very least, the extreme
decision rule adopted by the Court necessarily effects a change in constitutional meaning.
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The analogy to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Garcetti v.
Ceballos is particularly illustrative.27 In Garcetti, the Court held "that
when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline."' As in Engquist, a central justification for this
holding involved "the emphasis of [the Court's] precedents on affording
government employers sufficient discretion to manage their operations.
Employers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an
employee in his or her professional capacity."29 The Court rejected the
more nuanced view advanced by the Ninth Circuit and the dissent30 on
the grounds that such rules "demand permanent judicial intervention in
the conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with
sound principles of federalism and the separation of powers." 3 In short,
Garcetti illustrates that Engquist is part of a line of cases in which the
Court has opted to free public employers from litigation over
employment decisions that would not generate litigation in the private
context.
Thinking of Engquist along with Garcetti also indicates that the
Engquist decision is hardly indubitable. In particular, as the dissents (and
commentators) have argued, if there is a particular problem with
constitutional claims being made in the public employment context, then
this problem can be solved by narrow doctrinal solutions-axing out
entire types of claims from the law is excessive.3 2 But I will not dwell on
the contestability of Engquist for two reasons. First, others have already

27. 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2oo6); see also Araiza, supra note 3, at 6 9-70, 77-78. It should be noted that

labeling categorization as "conservative" and balancing as "liberal" would be too facile. See generally
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO.
L. Rav. 293, 317 (1992) ("Categorization and balancing are competing responses to analogical crisis.

The choice between them cannot successfully be explained by general constitutional theory. Nor can
the choice between them systematically determine outcomes. .. . If we are entering an era of increasing
categorization to conservative ends, then it is predictable that liberal advocates will favor balancing
approaches. But this is a contingent choice; balancing does not inherently favor rights, and balancing is
second-best to categorization that favors rights.").
28. 547 U.S. at 421.
29. Id. at 422.

30. See, e.g., id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The proper answer to the question 'whether the
First Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to
the employee's official duties,' is 'Sometimes,' not 'Never."' (citation omitted) (quoting id at 413
(majority opinion))).
31. Id. at 423 (majority opinion).

32. Interestingly, Justice Breyer dissented from Garcetti, id. at 444 (Breyer, J., dissenting), though
he proposed a narrower test than the main dissent, joined with the majority in Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at
2146, and wrote a short concurrence to the per curiam in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562, 56 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in result) (discussed below). This suggests, properly, that one's
analysis of all three fact patterns might admit of important differences.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

976

[Vol. 61:969

done so, and well." Second, I want to emphasize that although Engquist
is the law and thus binding on lower courts, as a matter of sound
jurisprudence those courts should not, and indeed must not, expand the
holding of Engquist.34 Furthermore, although the Supreme Court will
also presumably treat the holding of Engquist as settled, it ought not
magnify the harm by following the lower courts who have expanded the
reach of Engquist.

B.

OLECH

The Court specifically harmonized Engquist with its earlier decision
in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech." The plaintiff in Olech was asked to
provide a thirty-foot easement in return for connection with the
municipal water supply when similarly situated landowners had only
been asked to provide a fifteen-foot easement." Engquist insisted that it
did not disturb the "well settled" premises on which Olech relied, namely
that the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals as well as groups
and that it protects them when the state is acting administratively as well
as legislatively."
It was on the basis of these premises that the Court had concluded
in Olech that that plaintiff could state a claim under a class-of-one
theory. The two tax cases relied on by the Court in Olech stand for a
similar principle: the individual citizen is assured a minimal level of
rationality when classified by government bureaucracies?" In short, as the
Court put the heart of the matter in Engquist, "when it appears that an
individual is being singled out by the government, the specter of arbitrary
classification is fairly raised, and the Equal Protection Clause requires a
'rational basis for the difference in treatment."' 39
33. Most notably, there is Justice Stevens's dissent. See Engquist, I28 S. Ct. at 2157-61; see also
Araiza, supra note 3 (critiquing in particular the analysis by which the Court reached its result,
ignoring the subtle doctrines developed by lower courts). Notably, Richard Epstein filed an amicus
brief on behalf of the plaintiff in Engquist. See Brief for Richard Epstein & the Rutherford Institute as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16, Engquist, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2oo8) (No. 07-474) ("The

tradeoff therefore is this: Does this Court deny relief in rare cases of manifest and undisputed abuse
because of the unproven fear of unlimited litigation? The correct answer to that question is not to slam
the door, but to keep it ajar.").
34. To be sure, to the extent one is convinced that Engquist itself was poorly reasoned, it (likely)
follows that its error should not be extended.
35. 528 U.S. 562 (2000); Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2153. In fact, Olech came up over and over at oral
arguments, and both sides insisted that they were not challenging it. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 21-22, 29, 52, Engquist, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (No. o7-474) (questions of Justice Kennedy). Furthermore,
on my reading of the briefs and the many briefs of amici, none challenged Olech.
36. 528 U.S. at 563.
37. Engquist, 128S. Ct. at 210; Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
38. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 (citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County. 260 U.S. 441
(1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989)); see also Engquist, 128
5. Ct. at 2154.
39. 128 5. Ct. at 2153 (quoting Olech, 528 U.S. at 564). As Judge Posner put it:
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The Olech decision affirmed a Seventh Circuit opinion written by
Judge Posner,4 in which he relied on his earlier decision in Esmail v.
Macrane." Esmail was the basis for the hypothetical with which I began
this Article. In Esmail, the plaintiff had owned a liquor store for over ten
years and had always had his liquor license renewed annually.42 Esmail
was then told his original license (and his application for another license)
would be rejected for reasons that Esmail contended would not have
barred the renewal of the license of anyone else.43
The denial of equal protection is alleged to lie in the mayor's having
denied Esmail's two license applications in 1992 on the basis of trivial
or trumped-up charges while "maintain[ing] a policy and practice of
routinely granting new liquor licenses as well as renewing existing
licenses requested by persons who had engaged in the same or similar
conduct,... for the sole and exclusive purpose of exacting retaliation
and vengeance against" Esmail."
The Seventh Circuit found that Esmail had stated a claim under a classof-one theory.45
Given the developments of the doctrine, it is important to observe
that the provision of liquor licenses is hard to characterize as merely
"ministerial." The whole point of requiring a liquor license is to control
who is distributing a potentially dangerous substance, and it was
precisely these reasonable concerns with alcohol distribution that were
allegedly manipulated by the defendants in Esmail.'6 The facts in Esmail
also indicate another fact common to the business license scenario: a very
significant reliance interest. Esmail's store apparently primarily sold
liquor; it had already been in existence for ten years47 and presumably
had an inventory, a long-term lease for its space (or a mortgage), regular
employees, and the like. Presumably, a small business like this is very
sensitive to a shock to its cash flow.
The holding of Olech seemed to recognize all of this, presumably
satisfied that for the most part the decision rules noted above were a

[T]he fundamental insight of the class-of-one cases is that vicious or exploitative
discrimination can sometimes be found even when the victim does not belong to a group
that is a familiar target of such treatment. Indeed, a lone victim picked out for social or
economic oppression or extinction can be especially vulnerable. Unlike the member of even
a minority group, he has no allies at all.
Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F-3d 703,712 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
40.

Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 16o F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998).

41. 53 F.3d 176, 18o (7th Cir. 1995).
42. Id. at 177.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 178 (alterations in original).
45. Id. at i8o.

46. Id. at '77.
47. Id.
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HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:969

sufficient filter against meritless claims.8 After Engquist, the way to
approach a class-of-one theory under the Equal Protection Clause should
have been clear: all governmental action must at least pass muster under
the rational basis test, unless the particular government action had to do
with managing its own employees.
C.

THE CREEP OF ENGQUIST

Nevertheless, some lower courts have already begun to expand
Engquist beyond the public employment context into any area where the
government exercises "discretion."49 The Seventh Circuit applied
Engquist to probation decisions; 0 the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits to
public contracting;" the Eighth Circuit to police investigations. 2
Although all of these expansions were unwarranted for the reasons
discussed below, it has been district courts that have been most
aggressive so far, expanding Engquist to apply to situations of traditional
government regulation that strongly resemble the facts of Olech
(landowner easement) and especially Esmail (liquor license). 53
According to several of these courts, to prevail on a class-of-one
theory, a plaintiff must not only show arbitrarily different treatment from
others similarly situated, but a plaintiff must also demonstrate "that the
differential treatment received resulted from non-discretionary state
action.""
48. Note the discussion of Justice Breyer's concurrence infra note 91.
49. See Araiza, supra note 3, at 67-68 (predicting just this possibility based on the loose language
of Engquist); Michael L. Wells & Alice E. Snedeker, State-Created Property and Due Process of Law:
Fillingthe Void Left by Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 44 GA. L. REV. 161 (2oo9).

50. United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 900-o (7th Cir. 2oo8).
51. Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (iith Cir. 2oo8); Pignanelli v. Pueblo
Sch. Dist. No. 6o, 540 F.3d 1213, 1222 (ioth Cir. 2oo8).
52. Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794,799-800 (8th Cir. 2009).
53. See, e.g., Garber v. Flores, No. CV o8-42o8-DDP (RNB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48465, at
*11-12 (C.D. Cal. June 1o, 2009) (ticketing); Crippen v. Town of Hempstead. No. o7-CV-3478 (JFB)
(ARL), zoo9 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24820, at *27-28 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009) (housing inspections);
Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, No. 07 Civ. 3908(BMC) (RER), 2008 WL 4222042, at *3-5
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2oo8) (laboratory license); Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. I:07-CV-1290SEb-WTL, 2oo8 WL 4274451, at *9 (S.D. Ind. Sept. io, 2008) (educational placement). And now there

is also a relatively full-throated and convincing defense of the expansive dicta in Engquist by Robert
Farrell, one that also summarizes the creep of these dicta to other contexts. See Robert C. Farrell, The
Equal Protection Class of One Claim: Olech, Engquist, and the Supreme Court's Misadventure, 61 S.C.
L. REV. 107 (2009). It is important to observe that though Farrell's argument is flawed by my lights, it
is also nuanced and in many ways consistent with the argument herein. Farrell does think there is a
place for "selective enforcement"-type equal protection claims and he does think that the dicta in
Engquist go too far. See id. at 122-23, 129. To the extent there is disagreement as to the limits of the
class-of-one claim, I think in general that Farrell does not give enough credit to decision rules that
protect discretion (like qualified immunity), nor does he give sufficient credit to the benefit of public
reasons that justify a broader class-of-one-type claim being available. See infra Part II.B.3-454. Sloup v. Loeffler, No. o5-CV-1766 (JFB) (AKT), 2oo8 WL 3978208, at *15-x6 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 2008); see also Siao-Pao v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). See generally
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To the extent that this innovation is argued for, it is said to arise
from the following Engquist dictum:
There are some forms of state action.. . which by their nature involve
discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective,
individualized assessments. In such cases the rule that people should be
"treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions" is not violated

when one person is treated differently from others, because treating
like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion
granted. In such situations, allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary
singling out of a particular person would undermine the very discretion
that such state officials are entrusted to exercise. 5
It cannot be denied that all of these courts are reasonable in surmising
that this dictum suggests, contrary to the other parts of the opinion
highlighted above,56 that Engquist is to be read broadly, far more broadly
than just another public employment decision. And, in fact, not just this
dictum, but two other points made by the Court in this section of its
opinion point in this direction.
First, the Court specifically (re)characterizes Olech and the two tax

cases that preceded it as cases that involved a "clear standard."" Take
Allegheny, a case involving property tax assessments." In that case, the
county tax assessor consistently assessed certain properties at their
acquisition value (that is, roughly what the property owner paid for
them), but assessed others at their current fair market value.59 However,
state law required that all properties be assessed at current fair market
value." The assessor had conceded, foolishly, that there was no other
difference between the properties assessed by one method and those

assessed by the other-and even more damning was that only one of
these methods was sanctioned by state law.6 Allegheny was not about the
size of the disparities in assessment between similar properties because
ultimately the Court would uphold such disparities under a similar
system used by California in Nordlinger v. Hahn.' The main proposition

Willets Point Indus. & Realty Ass'n v. City of New York, No. o8-cv1453 (ERK) (JO), 2009 WL
4282017, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2009) ("While the Second Circuit has yet to rule on the issue,
district courts have almost universally extended the Engquist reasoning to all class-of-one claims, such
that successful plaintiffs now must additionally establish that the differential treatment was a result of
non-discretionarystate action.").

55. Sloup, 2oo8 WL 39782o8, at *16 (alteration in original) (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep't of
Agric., 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2154 (2oo8)).
56. See supra Part I.A.

57. See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2153. I say "recharacterize" because in none of these earlier cases
did the Court suggest there was anything but a pragmatic benefit to the clear numbers before it.
58. See 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
59. Id.at 338.

6o. Id.at 338, 345.
6x. See generally William Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County Commission, 38 UCLA L. REV. 87 ('990).
62. 505 U.S. i, iS (1992).
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that Allegheny seems to stand for is a concern with the "aberrational
enforcement policy" of a local government officialf which was exactly
the concern of the Olech Court. In fact, this concern with individual
officials is also manifest in the (related) exactions context. The
intermediate scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan applies when an official or local
adjudicatory body of the sort at issue in Olech, Allegheny, or Esmail,
requires a particular action from an individual landowner as a condition
for obtaining a land-use permit.64 Furthermore, as noted above, the
whole structure of § 1983 litigation-in which states cannot be sued but
their individual officials can be-also signals a particular concern with
individual discretion gone astray.
Nevertheless, Engquist digs deeper into the facts of Allegheny and
observes accurately that Allegheny did not revolve around the myriad
disputes that reasonable people might have about the valuation of
property; again, the defendant assessor had conceded that there was no
relevant difference between the properties assessed by different
methods. This stipulation, which certainly made adjudication of the legal
question in Allegheny easier, is emphasized by the dictum in Engquist.
That is, according to Engquist, the holding of Allegheny was not simply
that all similar property owners must be assessed similarly, but that the
only property owners who could state a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause were those who could show divergence from a "clear standard.""
In this same section of Engquist, the Court also offered a much cited
and problematic hypothetical:
Suppose, for example, that a traffic officer is stationed on a busy
highway where people often drive above the speed limit, and there is
no basis upon which to distinguish them. If the officer gives only one of
those people a ticket, it may be good English to say that the officer has
created a class of people that did not get speeding tickets, and a "class
of one" that did. But assuming that it is in the nature of the particular
government activity that not all speeders can be stopped and ticketed,
complaining that one has been singled out for no reason does not
invoke the fear of improper government classification. Such a
complaint, rather, challenges the legitimacy of the underlying action
itself-the decision to ticket speeders under such circumstances. Of
course, an allegation that speeding tickets are given out on the basis of
race or sex would state an equal protection claim, because such
discriminatory classifications implicate basic equal protection concerns.
63. See 488 U.S. at 344 n.4.
64. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005) (reiterating that Nollan/Dolan
analysis only applies to "land-use exactions," at least so far): see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,385 (1994) (emphasizing that the challenged
decision was adjudicative).
65. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146. 2553 (2008). If the Court had been focused on
this issue, it might have noted the perverse incentives that such a doctrine creates for local government
officials -so long as they are unclear, for instance, about the usual size of easements, then their
discretion protects them.
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But allowing an equal protection claim on the ground that a ticket was
given to one person and not others, even if for no discernible or
articulable reason, would be incompatible with the discretion inherent
in the challenged action. It is no proper challenge to what in its nature
is a subjective individualized decision that it was subjective and
individualized.
The biggest problem here is with the phrase "no discernible or
articulable reason." As Justice Stevens points out, this cannot mean what
it seems like it means, namely that there can be no equal protection claim
even if the ticket was issued for no reason at all; for instance, the speeder
must at least have been speeding or this would be a Fourth Amendment
violation. Furthermore, as Justice Stevens also notes, this phrase
obscures the reality that there are excellent reasons why only some
speeders get tickets (because of limited police resources, because only
some speeders can be pursued safely, etc.). 68 So rather than being wholly
exempt from equal protection analysis by reason of the officer's
discretion in issuing tickets to speeders, the officer's issuance of a ticket
in a particular case could easily pass rational basis review. In short, this is
a useless example if thought through carefully.
Again, consider the facts in Esmail. If a town had decided that it
would only issue ten liquor licenses in order to control the sale of liquor
and that they would be auctioned off randomly, then Mr. Esmail would
have no claim should he not get a license, even if in an odd way it would
be true that he was denied his license for "no reason." He would be like
the unlucky speeder-in other words, denying Esmail the license could
be justified on the rational basis that this was a fair distribution of a
resource reasonably limited on grounds of public policy. But Esmail's
claim is not analogous to that of the unlucky speeder. Instead, his claim is
that he was not speeding at all (i.e., he was following applicable
regulations and was still harmed), or perhaps that the officer literally
followed him around for days and gave him a ticket every moment he
went even one mile above the speed limit, no matter what the situation
and no matter what other motorists were doing (i.e., he was specifically
targeted for discriminatory action). Or, more clearly still, as to Esmail's
claim of a liquor license, his reliance interest makes his case even more
disanalogous to that of an unlucky speeder. If we assume that Esmail
poured significant capital into his business on the (reasonable) belief that
his business licenses would be adjudicated reasonably, then the arbitrary
or malicious denial of those licenses-resulting in the loss of at least part
of his investment -severely damages his reliance interest in the evenhanded administration of the town's licensing scheme. This is clearly

66. Id. at 2154.
67. Id. at 2159-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. See id.
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problematic in ways different from a cop giving out tickets to unlucky
speeders.
II. WHY

ENGQUIST SHOULD NOT

BE

BROADENED

A.

POOR AND IMPROPER JURISPRUDENTIAL

B.

OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE EXPANSION OF THE ENGQUIST RULE

METHOD
Nevertheless, the general rhetorical force of the broad dicta in
Engquist must be conceded. Setting aside the arguments above and
below about why these dicta are ill-advised, we must begin by
remembering that they are dicta. The holding of Engquist is only as to
public employment. For a lower court to expand Engquist and overturn
Olech, thus fundamentally changing equal protection law, would be
error.
Most obviously, this is because dicta, even Supreme Court dicta,
cannot be allowed to trump a holding. Making such dicta law is
tantamount to legislation. Further, these dicta seem to be of a most
virulent sort. Dicta are most dangerous when they represent vaguely
plausible notions about a much harder case not before the Court. That is,
the entire focus of the Justices, the parties, and the amici in Engquist was
on the public employment context.70 No one suggested overturning
Olech, and much less was there any consideration of a much harder case
like Esmail. As Judge Leval might put it, this dicta was not paid for by
the Court." In fact, Judge Reinhardt mischievously notes as much in his
dissent from the Ninth Circuit opinion in Engquist, the decision that the
Supreme Court affirmed in denying there can be a class of one in the
public employment context. Judge Reinhardt observes that Judge
Tashima, the author of the Ninth Circuit opinion affirmed by the Court
in Engquist, applied the conventional class-of-one analysis in another
case involving traditional regulation." Actually confronted with the
specter of arbitrary government action, this judge, like the Justices in
Olech, was (wisely) unwilling to pay the price to foreclose the plaintiff's
cause of action. Further evidence that this dicta was not thought through
is easy to come by, as demonstrated below.

There are many problems with the expansion of Engquist, but
before continuing to attack the expansion as such, it is important to
69. See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv.

1249, 1260 (2oo6) ("Courts make law only as a consequence of the performance of their constitutional
duty to decide cases. They have no constitutional authority to establish law otherwise.").
70. See generally id. at I 261-6371. See id. at 1262-63.
72. SeeEngquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, rol3-14 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (citing Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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observe that this expansion is unnecessary to achieve the legitimate goal
of safeguarding a zone for officials to act. This lack of necessity is itself a
sure sign that this dicta was not thought through.
i. Arbitrary Expansion of Official Immunity
The Supreme Court has long emphasized that it does not want
constitutional litigation to chill the use of legitimate discretion by
government officials. However, this is why officials sued in their
individual capacity are already shielded by some form of immunity. As a
general matter, legislators, prosecutors, and judges enjoy absolute
immunity in connection with their official functions. "For executive
officials in general, however,.. . qualified immunity represents the
norm." 74 The test for qualified immunity is objective,75 and, if the defense
of qualified immunity is raised, it must be addressed "at the earliest
possible stage in litigation."76 Qualified immunity is specifically meant to
protect executive officials acting within their discretion.?
Returning to the traffic officer from the Engquist hypothetical, we
see that he was already protected by qualified immunity. If he had good
reason to believe the driver was speeding, then the enforcement choice
of the officer would be protected by this significant series of decision
rules.?" However, the lower courts seem to believe that the hypo indicates
that any category of decisions resembling that of the officer is simply
unreviewable. If this is so, then what Engquist has essentially done is
grant absolute immunity against equal protection claims to any official
wielding discretion as to a member of a non-protected class (or even as
to a member of a protected class so long as the official does not
intentionally discriminate because of membership in that class). This
expansion seems hard to justify given that the officer's legitimate

73. Harlow v.Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo, 807 (1982).
74. Id. at 815.
75. See id. at 817-18.
76. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 8o8, 815 (2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227

('991)).
77. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.

78. And this is far from the only protective decision rule. Most obviously, the government is
protected by the rational basis standard. Governments are also now protected by rising pleading
requirements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). It is true that local government

entities themselves do not have qualified immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
638 (1980). However, a long series of § 1983 cases has limited the zone of liability for local
governments under a Monell theory. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Government entities cannot be held liable under § 1983 under a simple respondeat superior theory
and a positive decision (usually decisions) made by a decisionmaker must usually be shown to have
caused a plaintiff's injury in a very strong sense of "cause." See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
485 U.S. 312 (3988); Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (19) The exercise of
discretion within an official's authority is thus unlikely to cause liability for the entity that employs that
official.
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discretion is already protected, but this is only the beginning of the
trouble.
Is "Discretion"Itself a Clear (or Desirable) Standard?
2.
One feature of the Court's jurisprudence in Engquist and Garcetti is
a preference for bright-line rules. Certain kinds of claims are not just
made more difficult, but are categorically excluded by such rules. On the
surface, the expansion of the Engquist dicta looks like more of the same.
To the contrary, however, if the rule were that an Olech (i.e. class-ofone) claim would lie only when there was a "clear standard," then
litigants would engage in significant collateral litigation as to whether or
not there was such a "clear standard." Hence, far from setting forth an
efficient bright line rule limiting officials' liability for alleged equal
protection violations, expanding the Engquist dicta would merely force
courts to address time-consuming and uncertain collateral issues.
There is a long history of significant-and difficult-jurisprudence
concerning whether a government function is discretionary. Crucially,
this distinction has long been relevant to municipal tort liability under
state law,7 federal due process casest and federal tort liability under the
Federal Tort Claims Act." If the new rule were that there can be no
equal protection claim in an area of "discretion," then this would spur
still more litigation in this area. Not surprisingly, there is no consensus as
to when official acts are "discretionary."82 Even if that issue were settled,
79. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1995); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-201 (West
2002); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8546 (West 2007).

8o. This is because plaintiffs must demonstrate a protected property interest in order to show a
violation of the Due Process Clause. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972) (property
interest requirement). Thus, in my liquor license hypothetical, I could not allege a violation of
procedural or substantive due process without a showing that I had a property interest in my license,
and this I could not do if the government official in charge of dispensing the license had discretion as
to whether or not to give me the license. Compare Harlen Assocs. v. Incorporated Village of Mineola,
273 F-3d 494, 504-05 (2d Cir. 2oos) (typical case finding no property interest), with Wedges/Ledges of
Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62-64 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding property interest in licenses).
The result of including "discretion" in the Equal Protection Clause is thus to make even more hinge
on the fraught question of discretion. See Fields v. Village of Sag Harbor, No. 05-20949, 20o7 WL

2236393, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2007) (dismissing complaint based on Due Process Clause
because the government defendants had discretion, but allowing plaintiff's suit to proceed on equal
protection claim under Olech). To be sure, Wells & Snedeker, supra note 49. at 165, are correct to
argue that a rigorous due process analysis (i.e., a narrow definition of discretion) could revive many of
the claims undermined by Engquist and its creep. Yet it is hard to imagine the same Court that
emasculates the Equal Protection Clause undertaking such a project.
8i. See 28 U.S.C. §268o(a) (2oo6).
82. See, e.g., 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.04.10 (3d ed.
2003)

Stating the reasons for the discretionary-ministerial distinction is much easier than
stating the rule. First, the difference between "discretionary" and "ministerial" is artificial.
An act is said to be discretionary when the officer must exercise some judgment in
determining whether and how to perform an act. The problem is that "[i]t would be difficult
to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did not admit of some

March 2010]

THE EROSION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

985

however, and the Supreme Court believed that as a matter of policy
"discretion" should replace or supplement other procedural aspects of
constitutional litigation, the Court should do so by tinkering with the
decision rules that it has slowly crafted through common law
development (such as qualified immunity)." But it should not graft this
new rule onto the Constitution itself-if for no other reason than the
Court should not tie actual legislators' hands. Again, the expansion of
the Engquist rule means that class-of-one claims are not cognizable
under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. This expansion would
be a substantive limitation on the scope of the Clause itself, not a
decision rule, and hence would not be a rule that Congress could correct
through legislation.
Nevertheless, it might be objected that the Engquist dicta should be
expanded as a substantive limitation on equal protection claims because
discretion jurisprudence barring liability already exists and is fairly
functional-which is why it is generally a feature of tort claims statutes.4
Thus, the fact that federal and state governments have explicitly chosen
to give themselves (and their subdivisions) this protection under tort law
statutes and enjoy similar protection against due process claims as a
matter of federal constitutional law, can be argued to imply that such
protection should extend to class-of-one equal protection claims. So let
us assume at this point that the Engquist dicta is properly expanded such

discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving of a nail."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Ham v. Los Angeles County, 189 P. 462 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920)).
The Supreme Court's own attempts to clarify the meaning of discretion in connection with the Federal
Tort Claims Act have hardly resulted in a clear (or uncontroversial) jurisprudence. See United States
v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1991) (articulating the latest version of the analysis: "When
established governmental policy... allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be
presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion ... The focus of
the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute or
regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy
analysis."); see also James R. Levine, Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposalfor Institutional
Reform, ioo COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1541 n.21 (2000) ("Most analysis of the discretionary function
exception concerns its judicial interpretation. As predicted in an article written for this journal just
after the FTCA was passed, government tort liability has evolved 'through case-by-case analysis,'
much like '[t]he development of the private law of torts."' (alteration in original) (quoting Walter
Gellhorn & C. Newton Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 722,
740 (1947))).

83. On the shared doctrinal origins of qualified immunity and the discretionary action exception,
see, for example, Mark C. Niles, "Nothing but Mischief': The FederalTort Claims Act and the Scope of
DiscretionaryImmunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1280 (2002).

The preclusion of liability for "discretionary" government acts imposed by the exception
was founded on the traditional restrictions (commonly referred to by courts as "absolute" or
"qualified" governmental immunity) which were developed by American courts in response
to common law claims filed against government officers in the course of their official duties.
Id. (footnote omitted).
84. See, e.g., CAL Gov'T CODE §820.2; supra notes 79-81.
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that in class-of-one equal protection claims liability is barred for
"discretionary" actions by officials (in addition to the bar already
applicable in federal due process claims and in claims under the Federal
Tort Claims Act). In a case like Esmail or Olech, it would seem likely
that the plaintiff's suit would fail in a state whose tort law also bars
liability for discretionary acts, since there would be no un-barred theory
to serve as a basis for imposing liability.85 This would leave the plaintiff
with no remedy for his injury, despite arbitrary government action.
The likelihood that any relief for an Esmail-type claim would be
barred under state law (or due process jurisprudence) should more
properly go against the expansion of Engquist, either by courts or by
Congress. Whether or not the various state laws barring liability relied
on the continued viability of Olech-type claims (which would evidence a
legislative intent to preserve or not to preserve a class-of-one remedy for
injuries caused by discretionary actions by officials), the requirement that
citizens have a right to expect a minimum of rationality from their local
officials is inherent to our form of government, and is also just simply a
good idea.i The fact that governments do not want to get sued should
not undermine the fundamental constitutional values at issue.8
Furthermore, despite the Court's solicitude for the discretion of
officials, the Court has built its § 1983 jurisprudence on the (reasonable)
concern that it is appropriate for local governments to face greater
liability under § 1983. My hypothetical picks up on this intuition in
postulating a small community and a seemingly amateur bureaucrat.
Furthermore, in the hypo, all of my capital is tied up in my restaurant,
and I generally get by month-to-month. I am therefore especially
vulnerable. Arguably, this spiteful official has discretion over these
licenses; she must make a decision based on a set of criteria that we may
or may not agree are "clear" (or tantamount to setting policy). Yet is it
not because this official has this power over me that the law should be at
least a little solicitous of me? It is not in dispute that the official is

85. But see Genesis Envtl. Servs. v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 6 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 574' 583 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding equal protection theory viable under Olech even though no
state-based theory survived).
86. And, again, this area of law is not pellucid. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 357, 362
(Cal. 1968) (eschewing searching for a "semantic" or "mechanical" definition of "discretion" and
"allowing immunity for basic policy decisions ... but rejecting it for the ministerial implementation of
that basic policy"). The emphasis of the California Supreme Court on policymaking is sensible and
helpful in some cases, but in a case like Esmail it seems debatable whether the bureaucrat is making
policy or merely implementing it. See Hansen v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 920 F. Supp. 1480, 1501-02 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (finding defendants protected from § 1983 suit by qualified immunity, but not protected by
California law protecting discretion).
87. See infra Part II.B.3-488. For more on those values, see infra Part II.B.3-4.
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protected by qualified immunity and will have her judgment reviewed
under rational basis, but am I not entitled to at least that?
Again, as to exactions, the Supreme Court has been particularly
concerned about private dealing by individual officials and boards.
Justice Kennedy's controlling concurrence in Kelo v. City of New
London expresses a similar concern about pretextual actions by
government officials." The landowners in Olech presumably had no
argument for intermediate review under the Takings Clause because
there was a reasonable nexus and proportionality as to the easement as a
general matter. Once these concerns are met, are we so unconcerned
with differential treatment by local officials that they need not even
satisfy traditional rational basis review?
3. The Old Rule Is Functionaland Important
Even acknowledging all this, a supporter of the expansion of
Engquist could ask: compared to what? Such an objector would contend
that the cases following Olech have not succeeded in articulating a
functional jurisprudence by which to evaluate a class-of-one claim.? In
particular, the courts have stumbled over whether or not such a claim
requires evidence of subjective malice." Yet this is not a significant
objection because an appropriate analytic structure which reflects our
constitutional values is at hand, and that approach seems at least as
functional as a jurisprudence based on "discretion."
Neither at the level of theory nor practice must malice be
demonstrated in a class-of-one case, as was implicit in Olech itself. There
is a good argument, as a practical matter, that malice should be required

89. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490-91 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("This Court has declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause, as
long as it is 'rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.' This deferential standard of review
echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic regulation under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. The determination that a rational-basis standard of review is appropriate does not,
however, alter the fact that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private entities,
and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause. A court
applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear
showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public
benefits, just as a court applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause must strike
down a government classification that is clearly intended to injure a particular class of private parties,
with only incidental or pretextual public justifications." (citations omitted) (quoting Haw. Housing
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984))).
90. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 53, at 124 ("After the Supreme Court decided Olech in 2000, the
Second Circuit struggled to determine how the Olech class of one equal protection claim relates to the
Second Circuit's selective enforcement equal protection claim.").
91. Justice Breyer concurred in Olech specifically to point out that malice seemed to be present
there and in the other lead cases, and that malice ought to be required "lest we interpret the Equal
Protection Clause in this case in a way that would transform many ordinary violations of city or state
law into violations of the Constitution." See 528 U.S. 562, 56 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also
Bizzarro v. Miranda, 394 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing and summarizing the issue).
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because it is easier to show, as William Araiza has argued.92 Indeed, as
Araiza has further observed, courts are especially likely to find a
violation under rational basis review when they see malice, even if,
strictly speaking, a possible rational basis is also at hand and, therefore,
the equal protection claim should be defeated.? Even a class-of-one
skeptic like Farrell believes there is place for related "selective
enforcement" claims based on malice. 94 Yet, only allowing malice-type
suits to proceed would be too much of a sacrifice of principle. For one,
requiring malice would undermine the cases that even the Engquist
Court thought were viable-that is, the "clear standard" cases, as Olech
and Allegheny were re-conceived by the Court. The question then
becomes whether these two categories are sufficient, namely "clear
standard" and malice cases, and even then the answer is "no.")
Pure irrationality, even when a clear standard does not exist and
there is no malice, remains intelligible (leaving aside the difficult
question of what constitutes a "clear standard"). This is manifest in
theory. Suppose a capricious (and lazy?) bureaucrat just flips a coin to
decide whether or not I get a liquor license. This violates my right to be
treated rationally and forces me to live in fear of my livelihood.
Without doubt, the lead Supreme Court cases involving equal
protection and rational basis review, particularly City o Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.95 and Romer v. Evans, and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas,7 show signs of being
influenced by the presence of malice, just as Araiza would lead us to
expect. All of these cases also involve significant individual rights, as
Pam Karlan would lead us to expect.98 But consider another famous
rational basis decision, San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.99 This decision stands for the proposition that there is no

Araiza, supra note 3, at 53-54.
93. Id.; see William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases,
34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 493 (2007).
94. Farrell makes this point in connection with the infamous speeding hypo:
92.

To concede that underenforcement of the law is the norm, however, is not the same as to
condone selective enforcement of the law because of an impermissible, bad faith motive.
There is a difference between pulling over every tenth speeding car and pulling over every
speeding car whose driver is black, or every speeding car that has a "Pro Choice" bumper
sticker, or every speeding car that is driven by someone who recently sued the town
successfully. This kind of selective, bad faith enforcement of the law can be a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.
Farrell, supra note 53, at 122-23 (footnote omitted).
95. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
96. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
97. 539 U.s. 558, 58 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 McGEORGE L.REV. 473 (2002).
99. 411 U.S. I('973).
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fundamental right to an education.'" However, despite the fact that the
case did not involve a fundamental right, the Texas system of local
education finance that was challenged still needed to pass rational basis
review.'' The Texas system arguably failed this test because of the gross
disparities in resources available to educate students based on the
happenstance of property tax base.0 2 In order to find this to be rational,
the Court emphasized that the seeming irrationality resulted from
Texas's reasonable decision to endow local governments with power over
education." If citizens have significant power over local boundaries and
over educational revenue decisions, then significant variations are likely
to result, but these variations can be justified by the rational decision to
empower local decisionmaking.
This rationale had consequences more than a decade later when the
Court faced an esoteric school financing question in Papasan v. Allain."4
In Papasan, the Court confronted a complicated situation where, in
essence, certain lands given to the State of Mississippi by the federal
government for the purpose of public education were only generating
revenues for the school districts in which the lands happened to be
located.' The Court, speaking through Justice White (who had thought
the Texas system failed rational basis review), found that the Mississippi
allocation might fail rational basis review (the case was remanded) and
distinguished the situation from that upheld in Rodriguez as follows:
This case is therefore very different from Rodriguez, where the
differential financing available to school districts was traceable to

school district funds available from local real estate taxation, not to a
state decision to divide state resources unequally among school
districts. The rationality of the disparity in Rodriguez, therefore, which
rested on the fact that funding disparities based on differing local
wealth were a necessary adjunct of allowing meaningful local control
over school funding, does not settle the constitutionality of disparities

loo. Id. at 35.

ror. Id. at 44.
1o2. Id. at 68 (White, J., dissenting) (finding Texas system failed rational basis review); see also id.
at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The method of financing public schools in Texas, as in almost every
other State, has resulted in a system of public education that can fairly be described as chaotic and
unjust. It does not follow, however, and I cannot find, that this system violates the Constitution of the
United States." (footnote omitted)). Justice Stewart provided the fifth vote in Rodriguez.
103. See id. at 49, 53-54 (majority opinion) ("The persistence of attachment to government at the
lowest level where education is concerned reflects the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part,
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the freedom to devote more money to the
education of one's children. . . . But any scheme of local taxation-indeed the very existence of
identifiable local governmental units-requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that are
inevitably arbitrary.").
104. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
I05. Id. at 272-74.
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alleged in this case, and we differ with the Court of Appeals in this
respect. io6
In other words, Justice White took seriously the "rational basis" that
had been proffered in Rodriguez to justify the harm of differential school
financing. Because the rational basis that passed constitutional muster in
that case was distinguishable, he demanded a similarly sufficient rational
basis in Papasan, despite the absence in either case of a fundamental
right, the violation of a clear standard, or malice. If a rational basis had
not been required in Rodriguez, subsequent courts would not have had a
jurisprudential means of holding government officials even minimally
accountable for their actions in such cases, at least not on equal
protection grounds. Rodriguez clearly establishes, however, that even in
the absence of a fundamental right, violation of a clear standard, or
malice, the Equal Protection Clause demands that government officials
provide a justification of their actions sufficient to pass rational basis
review.
This "reason-giving" requirement, embodied in rational basis
review, puts desirable pressure on all levels of government officials to
remain honest. Consider, for example, the dynamic that played out
between Rodriguez and Papasan with respect to reason-giving.
Government officials in the later case were not permitted to rely on the
reasons given in the earlier case to justify a similar harm (differential
school financing) since the sources of the harms were distinguishable (in
Rodriguez, the harm was a consequence of local control of education,
while in Papasan, the harm flowed from the state's location-based
distribution of revenue generated from certain lands).'" Therefore, under
threat of equal protection liability, the defendants in Papasan were
required to come forward on remand with specifically tailored reasons
justifying the harm their financing policy had caused."
Although this dynamic occurred between cases, one can imagine the
same dynamic occurring within one case-and perhaps this is what
happened in Engquist. Remember that Ms. Engquist maintained that
io6. Id. at 288.
107. Id.

io8. Id. at 289.
As discussed below, this is a concrete example of the importance of reason-giving. By
requiring officials to give reasons, they are compelled to follow them in the next case or explain why
the reasons do not apply. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 657-58 (1995).
Of course, stare decisis and reasoned opinions are requirements that are similarly justified. See
generally id. This makes sense because in the end judges, too, are government officials exercising
tremendous power. Cf United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 18o, 193 (2d Cir. zoo8) (en banc.) (Calabresi,
J.) ("Requiring [district] judges to articulate their reasons [for sentences] serves several goals. Most
obviously, the requirement helps to ensure that district courts actually consider the statutory factors
and reach reasoned decisions. The reason-giving requirement, in addition, helps to promote the
perception of fair sentencing. Furthermore, the practice of providing reasons 'helps [the sentencing
process] evolve' by informing the ongoing work of the Sentencing Commission. Finally, for our own
1o9.
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she was dismissed for improper reasons, or, alternatively, for no reason
at all."0 It seems entirely possible that in arguing that they had no
improper reason to dismiss Ms. Engquist (to avoid her protected class
claim, for example), the defendants made it much more difficult on
themselves to articulate any reason to have dismissed her at all."' The
defendants, perhaps, thus avoided losing on the grounds of having an
improper reason, but only by setting themselves up for the argument that
they had no reason. To be sure, the defendants could have had a proper
reason, just like the defendants in Papasan could have, it just turned out
they could not articulate one that was satisfactory. The Rodriguez/Papasan
and Engquist examples demonstrate the desirability of allowing equal
protection challenges to remain viable even when they do not involve
malice or violations of a clear standard. Such challenges require
government actors to provide reasons for their actions, which helps
ensure that those actions are in fact reasonable, rather than arbitrary and
abusive.
So, if equal protection challenges not based on malice or a so-called
"clear standard" are to remain viable, then what should the test look
like? In my view, the test should be the one that Judge Reinhardt
thought governed the Ninth Circuit before Engquist. As the judge
explained:
The plaintiff can show that no rational basis exists in a class-of-one
case by showing that an "asserted rational basis was merely a pretext
for different treatment." Such pretext may be shown by demonstrating
"either: (i) the proffered rational basis was objectively false; or (2) the
defendant actually acted based on an improper motive." As to the
second prong, reasons that are "malicious, irrational or plainly
arbitrary" cannot provide a rational basis. Thus, malice can in some
circumstances serve as a basis for showing both disparate treatment
and lack of rational basis."

purposes, an adequate explanation is a precondition for 'meaningful appellate review.' We cannot
uphold a discretionary decision unless we have confidence that the district court exercised its
discretion and did so on the basis of reasons that survive our limited review. Without a sufficient
explanation of how the court below reached the result it did, appellate review of the reasonableness of
that judgment may well be impossible." (third alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Rita
v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2oo7); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007))).

io. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128S. Ct. 2146, 2149 (2008).
iii. As Justice Stevens observes, there is some evidence that this is exactly what happened. Id. at
2158-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Here, as in Olech, Engquist alleged that the State's actions were
arbitrary and irrational. In response, the State offered no explanation whatsoever for its decisions; it
did not claim that Engquist was a subpar worker, or even that her personality made her a poor fit in
the workplace or that her colleagues simply did not enjoy working with her. In fact, the State explicitly
disclaimed the existence of any workplace or performance-based rationale.").
112. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1o13-14 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 945-46 (9th
Cir. 2004); Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996)). Judge Reinhardt does not focus
on the hard question of whether malice alone renders a decision irrational. Judge Posner is certainly
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Pragmatically, to be sure, few claims of this nature will survive summary
judgment, especially given the other constraining decision rules. And of
those claims, most will involve malice or a deviation from a clear
standard, but not all. As Judge Leval explained of this type of claim, "an
Olech-type equal protection claim focuses on whether the official's
conduct was rationally related to the accomplishment of the work of their
agency."" 3
4. In Defense of RationalBasis
Perhaps, though, the objection to the traditional equal protection
analysis is deeper, and it is an objection to rational basis review
altogether. After all, this level of review is so deferential that few
government actions will fail-why bother governments with these cases
at all? The import of cases like Cleburne, Romer, and Plyler v. Doe"4
should provide some indication that this kind of review can be important,
but these cases are often viewed as surreptitiously applying some kind of
more stringent rational basis review."' Yet even if it were correct that

right that it does not; officials are people and they are certainly entitled to feelings of anger and
frustration with difficult individuals or institutions, but what they cannot do is act against such people
only out of such feelings. See Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F-3d 503, 713 (Posner, J., concurring).
113. Bizzarro v. Miranda, 394 F.3d 82, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2005).
114. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
115. See, e.g., Farrell supra note 5, at 415 ("This search for an underlying principle that would

explain the results in the heightened rationality cases appears to be unsuccessful. Rather, it appears
that the Court, without explanation, decided in a particular case to use heightened rationality and thus
the claim succeeded. The Court then proceeded to ignore that case in the future."): see also Bell, 367
F.3d at 710 (Posner, J., concurring). The notion that these cases rely on something other than rational
basis review seems to rely most of all on the (reasonable) surmise that if these cases represented
ordinary rational basis review, then the principles on which they rest could be articulated and applied.
To be sure, this is how cases should usually be decided, especially those chosen for review by the
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, it has long been understood that justice cannot always be reduced to
general principles, which is why justice is more than law, but also includes equity. Equity means many
things but it has always been associated with particularized justice. See generally Darien Shanske,
Revitalizing Aristotle's Doctrine of Equity, 4 LAW CULTURE & HUMANITIES 352 (2oo8) (emphasizing role
of practical wisdom on the part of judges in deciding equitably); Darien Shanske, Note, Four Theses:
Preliminaryto an Appeal to Equity, 57 STAN. L. REv. 2053 (2005) (surveying equity tradition). It would
be anomalous if the Supreme Court, which is a court of equity, U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, Cl. i, should be

prevented in the odd case from rendering particularized justice. This is all the more true given the fact
that (x) Court decisions need to be a matter of consensus; and (2) poorly considered general principles

can do more harm than good, even if the decision is correct-this is arguably the case with the general
musings from Engquist. A clearly individualized decision about the category of public employment
would have caused much less mischief. This may suggest a paradox, namely that a rational basis
decision need not be as general in its reasoning as the government decisions under review in these
cases, but the paradox is illusory. The nature of equity is itself a reason why not all judicial decisions
are generalizable in the same way, and the facts of the individual cases indicate why they were the
correct decision in that case (e.g., disallowing animus against immigrant children in Plyler) even if this
reasoning cannot be generalized according to standard categories used in American jurisprudence
(e.g., refusing to make the disabled into a protected class in Cleburne). If a government official can
make a case as sound as the Court did in its equitable rational basis decisions, then clearly that
government decision will survive rational basis review, and it should.
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virtually no plaintiff would ever win if a true rational basis test were
applied, then there are independent arguments for not wiping out the
class-of-one cause of action.
In short, the importance of the exercise of reason-giving should not
be gainsaid, even if the reason given will generally be sufficient to defeat
the claim of the plaintiff. Versions of this argument emerge from a
variety of disciplines and perspectives, including our own constitutional
history. It is axiomatic that republicanism was a dominant strain of
thinking among the founders and that this tradition in political theory
was particularly concerned with the arbitrary exercise of government
power." 6 A government official who can deny or revoke a powerful
privilege without so much as a reason would seem to be the very picture
of arbitrariness:
Being unfree does not consist in being restrained; on the contrary, the
restraint of a fair system of law-a non-arbitrary regime-does not
make you unfree. Being unfree consists rather in being subject to
arbitrary sway: being subject to the potentially capricious will or the
potentially idiosyncratic judgement of another."
Worse than merely arbitrary, a government official acting in such a
manner literally dominates the governed to the extent that they are
subject to his or her whim, and this whim cannot be meaningfully
contested. This does not go only for major issues, but minor ones." One
is not free in this rich republican sense if one is living in fear of petty
"offenses."9
Even contemporary political theorists who discount the relevance of
republicanism to our modern polity strongly emphasize the import of
impersonal execution of the law. 20 It is central to both our economic and
political systems that all are guaranteed equal access. One need not spin
out my initial hypothetical very far to see this point. Suppose the mayor
is denying me a liquor license to protect my competitor; this kind of
political shield from competition is manifestly a drag on our economy.
Conversely, now suppose that I am being denied the license because I
was a vocal supporter of the mayor's political opponent; the central

i16. The recent classic on republicanism is PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENT (David Miller & Alan Ryan eds., 1997), upon which these next few sentences are

based. On the republican tradition, see id at 18-35.
117. Id. at 5.
i18. Id. at 52, 55, 183-85 (discussing a definition of domination which includes arbitrariness and
the connection between contestability of public decisions and nonarbitrariness).
i19. Id. at 195-96.
120. Compare DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY 194-97 (2009) (arguing that the republican
tradition was backwards looking and did not anticipate the revolutionary economic and political

developments of the nineteenth century), with id. at 154-58, 265-66 (emphasizing import of rule of
law, particularly the impersonal provision of government services).
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competitive mechanisms of our political system are undermined when
there is no rule of law.
There is no need here to belabor this point. The jurisprudential,
historical, and theoretical arguments for requiring reason-giving are wellknown and currently part of our law.' The Court's confused dicta in
Engquist itself provides no good reason to slide away from this.
5. Why This Dicta Is Bad for Local Governments
Clearly the rule I am advocating, and the rule I believe is currently
the law, is better for plaintiffs, though only slightly. It will only help an
actual plaintiff win a case in rare egregious situations. Nevertheless, it is
not viable to insist that the Equal Protection Clause provides not one
iota of protection to an individual interacting with government on a
matter left to the government's discretion.
Still, one argument for the expansion of Engquist is that it is more
protective of state and local governments. Most plaintiffs will still lose
under the old rule of Olech, but presumably more will try than under the
harsh new regime of expanded Engquist, tying up governments in
litigation. No doubt one of the polestars of § 1983 doctrine has been
balancing the need to protect the public fisc and also to empower
government officials to show initiative in solving problems. As to the
handful of egregious cases that may arise, there is a good argument to be
made that extraordinarily arbitrary actions aimed at an individual are
likely to offend against some other provision of either the state or federal
constitution, federal or state civil rights law, or federal or state
administrative law. It is also surely true that governments should not be
assumed to be bad actors.
To respond: First, the contingent availability of these other remedies
should not limit the reach of one of the most basic constitutional
protections, if only because of the strength of the arguments as a matter
of general political theory for everyone to be able to turn to the Federal
Constitution for at least a minimal level of rationality. Second, we have
seen that there are many cases, such as that involving a local liquor
license, where it is not certain, at least to this observer, that a plaintiff has
additional remedies. Third, even the expanded Engquist discretion rule

121. Recently, Glen Staszewski summarized the traditional arguments for reason-giving as follows:
First, reason-giving promotes accountability by limiting the scope of available discretion and
ensuring that public officials provide public-regarding justifications for their decisions.
Second, reason-giving facilitates transparency, which, in turn, enables citizens and other
public officials to evaluate, discuss, and criticize governmental action, as well as potentially
to seek legal or political reform. Most fundamentally, reason-giving fosters democratic
legitimacy because it both embodies, and provides the preconditions for. a deliberative
democracy that seeks to achieve consensus on ways of promoting the public good that take
the views of political minorities into account.
Glen Staszewski, Reason-Givingand Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (2009).
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would be costly because it would be so hard to administer. Many of the
same cases would be brought and more confused jurisprudence of
discretion would be created. And this is on top of the fact that plaintiffs
are unlikely to just bring a class-of-one suit, which is to say that the
expansion of Engquist promises a false economy if, as in the case of Ms.
Engquist herself, plaintiffs are likely to sue local governments on many
different theories.
Finally, and most importantly, the fact that governments should be
presumed to be good actors can be seen as pointing the other way. It is
no disrespect to governments to note that their employees are often
working under a lot of pressure and often with limited resources. As
good actors trying to do their jobs, they need to be directed to what it
means to do one's job properly as a government employee.
This final point can be recharacterized as following from the wellworn paradox of autonomy. The ability of one person to do an act is
often a disability to another person, either to do that act or some other.
This is obviously true as to the government regulator and the regulatee in
cases like Olech or Esmail. The government's ability to deny my liquor
license is a disability for me. This dynamic holds true within the
bureaucracy as well; the "discretion" of one regulator to act without
giving reasons serves as a gravitational pull on other regulators who
would otherwise feel themselves constrained by the time-consuming and
perhaps risky practice of reason-giving. Think of the task of an agency's
counsel who, in response to an agency practice of giving imperious
conclusions to applicants, advises that more transparent procedures and
fuller explanations are required. It helps all but the (few) bad actors for
the counsel to be able to say that the law requires clear procedures and
public explanation because all decisions must be at least minimally
justifiable.
A decision like Olech thus really stands for the uncontroversial
proposition that governments should have an orderly and transparent
process when dealing with citizens. The government is not in fact a
private business. If I find that my bank is wholly incapable of keeping
track of my records and of treating my account the same way as those of
others, then I can switch banks. A citizen who requires a license to
operate his business is not in the same position because the government
(properly) has a monopoly, which is the main reason why the
government must be subject to different and stiffer controls (like other
monopolies, only more so). In the chaos of running a government
bureaucracy, it is easy to forget the difference. Sometimes a law that
seems to harm an interest actually helps it. I suggest that the current law
helps focus the mind of well-intentioned employees and discipline those
inclined to go too far, and thus that an extended version of Engquist
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would tend to bolster the force of entropy, resulting in less good
government, not more.
CONCLUSION

I have argued that Engquist should mean only what it says, namely
that a certain type of equal protection claim in the public employment
context is not viable. I have explained my reasons, including the fact that
the status quo is just fine. But the most important reason relates to
constitutional values; it is one thing to limit claims under the Equal
Protection Clause pragmatically, but quite another to deny categorically,
as a matter of federal constitutional law, that citizens have a right to a
day in court when they are most at risk of arbitrary treatment from
government officials.

